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Protecting the Protectors 
Fictional events 
An overseas terrorist group has carefully planned a number of attacks in and around London.  Five 
loĐal ͞sleepeƌ͟ ŵeŵďeƌs ;ǁho aƌe Ŷot kŶoǁŶ to the UK authoƌitiesͿ haǀe ĐoŶǀeƌted tǁo petƌol 
tanker lorries into mobile explosive devices. The five have also been receiving and storing small 
consignments of military-grade weapons, ammunition, hand grenades and explosives, all smuggled 
into the UK over the preceding months. A further sixteen terrorists then arrive in the UK at night on 
a beach, where they are met by one of the sleeper members who takes them to a safe-house.  They 
are then supplied with the weapons and other military equipment, and are ready to mount their 
attacks.  
The first attack is at a large outdoor ceremony in a park in central London. Three terrorists on 
powerful off-road motorcycles race across the park towards the ceremony. Although no weapons or 
explosives can be seen a command is given for police officers to shoot the riders. Two of the 
motorcyclists are shot dead, and the third motorcyclist is injured but manages to detonate his 
suicide vest, killing and injuring twenty-two people. Three bystanders also die, as a result of shots 
fired by the police against the terrorists. The other two terrorists were also found to have been 
wearing suicide vests.  
At the same time, two London airports are attacked using the petrol tankers.  One of the tankers is 
driven into a crowded terminal building and detonated, causing multiple casualties and setting the 
building ablaze. At the other airport, the attacker drives the tanker onto the main runway into the 
path of an aeroplane queuing for take-off.  The driver of the tanker then leaps out of the vehicle and 
runs away, remotely detonating the tanker, which sets the plane on fire. The terrorist (unarmed) is 
shot and killed by the crew of an armed response vehicle (ARV) who witnessed the attack and 
identified the perpetrator. 
Three further large-scale attacks take place at major towns in south-east England, about thirty 
minutes after the London attacks.  Sixteen terrorists are involved and they use hand grenades and 
automatic weapons to kill members of the public and arriving police officers.  One attack is in a 
crowded high street and another takes place in a large shopping centre. The third attack is at a 
prominent public school attended by the children of politicians, diplomats, high-ranking military 
officers, celebrities and the wealthy elite.  The terrorists block the main gateway of the school with a 
lorry, which they set ablaze. They then proceed to sweep through the school, shooting as many 
people as they can find.   
Police officers from several different police forces, including those from non-Home Office forces rush 
to the scenes of the attacks and confront the terrorists in a number of fire-fights. In one incident the 
iŶitial ĐoŵŵaŶdeƌ oƌdeƌs the aƌŵed offiĐeƌs to, ͞“aǀe as ŵaŶǇ people as possiďle, espeĐiallǇ the 
kids.͟ While iŶ the seĐoŶd poliĐe foƌĐe aƌea the ĐoŵŵaŶdeƌ oƌdeƌs the offiĐeƌs to, ͞Kill the teƌƌoƌists 
as quickly as possible and minimise ciǀiliaŶ Đasualties.͟ AŶ houƌ afteƌ the attaĐks iŶ LoŶdoŶ, the 
Prime Minister chairs an emergency meeting of the COBRA (Cabinet Office Briefing Room A) 
committee and quickly orders the police, who have now been joined by Special Forces personnel to, 
͞eliminate the thƌeat to the puďliĐ as eǆpeditiouslǇ as possiďle.͟ 
  
Of the sixteen remaining terrorists, seven are killed by police or military personnel and six detonate 
their suicide vests in the early stages of the attacks.  The final three take a number of hostages at the 
school, in a gymnasium. As the police and military units close in, the terrorists begin to execute the 
hostages. Some of the hostages panic and manage to escape.  In the confusion the first two hostages 
who emerge from the building are mistakenly shot by police officers.  The police and military 
personnel then enter the building, and in the operation that follows, one terrorist is shot dead, one 
detonates his suicide vest and the third is savaged by a military dog and is killed before he can 
detonate his vest.                       
Introduction 
The kind of fictitious events described above remain unlikely but worryingly possible.  The armed 
poliĐe offiĐeƌs ǁho ǁould ƌespoŶd to suĐh iŶĐideŶts aƌe desigŶated ͚Authorised Firearms Officers͛  
(AFOs). The AFOs remain at all times police officers who, on initial appointment to the office of 
Police Constable made a formal attestation that amongst other things, committed them to 
͚upholdiŶg fuŶdaŵeŶtal huŵaŶ ƌights͛ ǁhiĐh iŶĐlude the ƌight to life. They are also bound by a Code 
of Ethics (issued as a code of practice under s 39A of the Police Act 1996), incorporated as a central 
featuƌe of the poliĐe ͚NatioŶal DeĐisioŶ Model͛. The Code of EthiĐs iŶĐludes the teŶ staŶdaƌds of 
professional behaviour, including “taŶdaƌd ϰ ͞Use of FoƌĐe͟ (necessary, proportionate and 
ƌeasoŶaďle iŶ the ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐesͿ aŶd “taŶdaƌd ϱ ͞Oƌdeƌs aŶd IŶstƌuĐtioŶs͟ (give and carry out lawful 
orders and instructions and comply with policies). Of particular note and importance for the AFO is 
the 2003 Hoŵe OffiĐe ͞Code of PƌaĐtiĐe oŶ PoliĐe use of Fiƌeaƌŵs aŶd Less Lethal WeapoŶs͟ aŶd the 
College of PoliĐiŶg aŶd NatioŶal PoliĐe Chiefs͛ CouŶĐil (NPCC) 2013  ͚Authorised Professional Practice 
–Armed Policing͛ ;APP-AP).  
In this opinion piece we ask if, in light of significant changes in threat to the public, whether policies 
aŶd guideliŶes suƌƌouŶdiŶg aŶ AFO͛s use of foƌĐe should not be comprehensively debated and 
revised to provide more clarity in the light of changing circumstances. As many readers will recall, 
the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, ordered a review of the law governing police use of 
firearms after a meeting of the National Security Council in December 2015, after pressure from 
police chiefs in the wake of the Paris attacks. However, events in 2016 have seen Cameron leave 
office and (apart from  occasional media speculation1) there has been no official news of progress of 
the review, apparently being conducted by the Home Office but also involving the Attorney General, 
the Ministry of Justice (and, one must assume, the NPCC).  
In our view it is important that a wider debate is also led by Parliament, has a wide arc of public 
consultation and results in clear guidance for AFOs and their commanders who, on our behalf, have 
to cope with life-threatening and traumatic situations. For, although the scenario described above is 
thankfully fictional, what is certain is that UK policing is readying itself for a serious armed conflict, 
with resources, personnel and public statements of reassurance of the state of readiness. This being 
the case, the police cannot make plans in isolation but must have the support of the law-makers in 
Parliament and those they serve. Public opinion must uŶdeƌstaŶd aŶd eŶdoƌse the Ŷeed foƌ a ͞ŵetal 
fist͟ that ŵaǇ Ŷot alǁaǇs ďe ĐoŶĐealed iŶ a ǀelǀet gloǀe. Atteŵpts, suĐh as the teleǀised ͞shoǁ aŶd 
tell͟ ďǇ the CoŵŵissioŶeƌ of the MetƌopolitaŶ PoliĐe ǁheŶ iŶtƌoduĐiŶg the peƌsoŶŶel aŶd 
                                                          
1 Foƌ eǆaŵple,  ͞Do police have the firepower to tackle gun menace?͟, BBC Neǁs, ϭϳ MaǇ ϮϬϭϲ, ͚Home Office 
review of police firearms use͛, ChaŶŶel ϰ Neǁs, Ϯϳ MaǇ ϮϬϭϲ. 
  
eƋuipŵeŶt fuŶded ďǇ the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ͞A‘V Uplift͟2, will orient the public to the new landscape 
but we question whether this preparedness has also considered the aftermath and investigation 
process, which, under current policy and practice, policing in the UK is tightly bound. Simply put and 
setting aside the unquestioned abilities of firearms officers, this ĐapaďilitǇ ͚window dressing͛ does 
not address questions of who shares the responsibility for killing terrorists that threaten us and 
whether it is right to hold those officers involved in fire-fights to account in the same way as those, 
for example, suspected of corruption or malpractice in the police service.  The responsibility for how 
armed policing operations unfold and conclude is unclear and  rather than an open debate resulting 
in a clear and unequivocal set of principles enshrined in law we currently have a what might be too 
easily viewed as a process of issue avoidance that allows police forces to accumulate large quantities 
of arms, train officers to high levels of proficiency to deal with a potent threat without clearly and 
unequivocally, telling them what the consequences of  their actions following such a confrontation 
may be.     
Time for a re-think? 
PuŶĐh ;ϮϬϭϲͿ ideŶtifies that the ͞ƌules of eŶgageŵeŶt͟ foƌ aƌŵed officers, particularly when dealing 
with terrorists are unduly weighted against the officer who pulls the trigger. This, he says has been 
the case for too long, highlighting the cases of Ashley, 19983, Stanley 19994 and Stockwell 20055 and 
supports the direction suggested by Justice Rafferty of drawing accountability upwards to the 
corporate level. Officers involved in shootings, particularly those that are controversial, sometimes 
have to endure years of legal processes that are costly to the public purse and can be personally 
deǀastatiŶg. As ƌeĐeŶt ͞histoƌiĐ͟ tƌials haǀe deŵoŶstƌated, offiĐeƌs ĐaŶ ďe held to aĐĐouŶt Ǉeaƌs 
after an incident, the most recent being Tony Long of the MPS, charged with murder nine years after 
the shooting of Azelle Rodney6 and standing alone in the dock of the Old Bailey with none of those 
who mounted, ran or decided how to conclude the operation being co-defendants. 
So, as a society we have a serious issue to decide; who should hold the responsibility for the deaths 
of those killed by agents of the State? The current NPCC APP-AP appears clear enough:  
͚Each AFO is individually responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions, nothing can 
absolve them from such responsibility and accountability. This includes decisions to refrain from using 
force as well as any decisive action taken, including the use of force, the use of a firearm and the use of 
a less lethal ǁeapoŶ͛ ;CoP, ϮϬϭϯ).  
WheŶ ideŶtifǇiŶg ͚Constraint, Direction and AuthorisatioŶ of AĐtioŶ͛ the APP-AP explains that: 
                                                          
2 ͞Moƌe aƌŵed poliĐe set to pƌoteĐt LoŶdoŶ saǇ Met Đhief aŶd ŵaǇoƌ.͟ BBC Neǁs ϯrd August 2016. 
3 BBC News 12/11/03 and Hansard, 11/2/02 (Col. 46-49 Mrs Louise Ellman MP [Liverpool, Riverside]) 
4 ͞HaƌƌǇ “taŶleǇ – IPCC publishes decision and report (Press release) IPCC 2006-02-09. 
http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/pr090206stanley  
5 IPCC (2007) Stockwell One: Investigation into the Shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes on Stockwell 
Underground Station on 22 July 2005. London: IPCC. 
6 The Independent 30th JulǇ ϮϬϭϰ ͞Aƌŵed PoliĐe OffiĐeƌ Đhaƌged ǁih ŵuƌdeƌ oǀeƌ Azelle ‘odŶeǇ “hootiŶg.͟ 
http://independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/armed-police-officer-charged-with-murder-over-azelle-rodney-
shooting-9638777.html ;aĐĐessed Ϯϯ/ϴ/ϭϲͿ aŶd BBC Neǁs ϯƌd JulǇ ϮϬϭϱ ͞Met PoliĐe offiĐeƌ AŶthoŶǇ LoŶg 
Đleaƌed of Azelle ‘odŶeǇ ŵuƌdeƌ.͟ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london33386224 (accessed 
23/8/16) 
  
 ͚Where command decisions are made to constrain, or direct, or authorise the action of an AFO, the 
communication from the commander will form an essential part of an AFOs decision making. Any 
direction or authorisation from a commander to an AFO in these circumstances must be communicated 
with absolute clarity what is being directed or authorised and the action required, including any time 
imperative.  
If a commander decides that as a last resort a critical shot is absolutely necessary in self-defence, which 
includes the defence of another, a commander will communicate that decision to an AFO with the 
ǁoƌds, ͞ĐƌitiĐal shot authoƌised͟, and an AFO will be entitled to rely on them subject to whatever other 
information is available, principally that from the scene. Such a communication is an authorisation to 
use such force and not an ordeƌ to do so͛ ;iďid.) 
Post incident, a commander will be accountable for giving the authorisation and the AFO for their 
response. 
Turning to the Code of Ethics, Standard 4 states that 
͚I will only use force as part of my role and responsibilities and only to the extent that it is necessary, 
proportionate and reasoŶaďle iŶ all the ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͛ (CoP, 2014, p. 4). 
and later at 4.3  
͚[…]  you must use only the minimum amount of force necessary to aĐhieǀe the ƌeƋuiƌed ƌesult͛ ;CoP, 
2014, p. 8). 
 Standard 4.4 cautions that  
͚You will have to account for any use of force, in other words justify it based upon your honestly held 
belief at the tiŵe that Ǉou used the foƌĐe͛ ;iďidͿ. 
Two further extracts from the Code of Ethics are worth considering here. Standard 5 states that 
 ͚I will, as a police officer, give and carry out lawful orders only, and will abide by police regulations. I 
will give reasonable instructions only and will folloǁ all ƌeasoŶaďle iŶstƌuĐtioŶs͛ ;CoP, ϮϬϭϰ, p.ϰͿ. 
Also, when considering the use of discretion, Standard 5.5 explains that: 
͚Police discretion is necessary but must be used wisely. When making decisions about using your 
discretion you must: 
 use your training, skills and knowledge about policing  consider what you are trying to achieve and the potential effects of your decisions  take any relevant policing codes, guidance and procedures into consideration  ensure you are acting consistently with the principles and standards in this Code͛ 
 (CoP, 2014. P. 10). 
It is not difficult (Punch, 2011, 2012 & 2016; Squires and Kennison, 2010) to identify the weight of 
responsibility resting on the shoulders of the individual AFO to justify both action and inaction and 
all too easy to see what direction any enquiry would be likely to take, at least in the initial stages. 
Analysis of the fictional events 
  
The first point to consider is whether it was lawful to shoot dead the two motor-cycling terrorists. 
Later evidence might prove that the decision taken and the command given were both probably life-
saving but, at the time the decision was taken to open fire, was a calculated risk taken (by necessity) 
on the spur of the moment. Post-hoc legal justification for the decision could likely be based in part 
on the ͚reasonable suspicion͛ contained in Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967. This piece of 
legislation has been the bulwark of defences mounted by AFOs for nearly fifty years and together 
with the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, (which allows an offiĐeƌ ǁith aŶ ͚hoŶest aŶd 
iŶstiŶĐtiǀe͛ belief that opening fire was reasonable) and common law provisions of self-defence has 
stood as a buttress behind which embattled AFOs have taken refuge. The question in this particular 
set of circumstances is whether all AFOs will be willing to take this calculated risk in case it later 
emerges that the motor-cyclists are not terrorists and they, the AFOs, are in then in jeopardy of 
facing criminal charges.  Further, it could be questioned whether the command given to shoot the 
motor-cyclists was lawful or just lucky. Based on the limited information available, it is legitimate to 
question whether such a critical shot authorisation would be given, although with the imprecise way 
iŶ ǁhiĐh deliǀeƌiŶg ͞ƌeasoŶaďle iŶstƌuĐtioŶs͟ aŶd ͞authoƌisatioŶs͟ happens, it still seems likely that 
the AFOs would be left alone to face an inquiry. It is also, we suggest, not only reasonable but highly 
likely to suppose that in such dynamic circumstances that instinct will play a large part of what is said 
and done and text-book precision, whilst desirable, is extremely unlikely to be prominent.      
The second point to consider is the action to be taken in respect of the casualties at the large 
outdoor ceremony who were shot dead by police officers, who in a war would be regarded as being 
Đaught iŶ tƌagiĐ ďut uŶaǀoidaďle ͚Đƌoss fiƌe͛. Their status as innocent victims presents a difficulty that 
could result in lengthy litigation and/or prosecutions for damages or violations of Health and Safety 
legislation7. However, the sobering fact is that even if they are not the intended target, bystanders 
close to any terrorist action are likely to become casualties. Modern ammunition of the type carried 
and used by police officers in the UK is very powerful, capable of travelling long distances and still 
inflicting fatal injuries even as it decelerates. Shooting at a fast moving object is extremely difficult, 
even for the best trained shot under training conditions and rounds that miss or ricochet from their 
intended target, in an urban settiŶg ǁheƌe Đƌoǁds aƌe gatheƌed, ŵaǇ Đause this ͞Đollateƌal daŵage͟ 
with no malicious intent or even knowledge of consequence on behalf of the shooter.    
Next, let us think of the terrorist who has caused an aviation disaster at one of the major airports in 
London but seems to have been shot as an act of revenge. Can the officers who shot this person 
claim the protection of the Criminal Law Act? Article 2 ECHR states that everyone has a right to life 
and the test of absolute necessity will be applied under this legislation. Can the officers claim that, 
even if they could not see that the person was armed, they had witnessed an act calculated to result 
in mass casualties and it was absolutely necessary to stop a further act of this nature or have they 
acted as judge, jury and executioner, providing prima facie evidence for a criminal charge to be laid? 
We will return to this point below. 
Let us turn now to the commands issued by both police and political leaders in the heat of the 
moment and examine the commands of the police in the light of the prevailing policy and guidance.  
If one accepts that in fast-moving situations where casualties are mounting and personal and 
                                                          
7 As happened in the Stockwell case where a young Brazilian man, Jean-Charles DeMenezes, was mistaken for 
a terrorist and shot dead by the Metropolitan Police at Stockwell Underground station. The Metropolitan 
Police were later convicted of breaching Health and Safety Regulations. 
  
professional jeopardy may be significant factors, communication, which is vital for precision, 
becomes essential. However, the manner in which commands are issued may not always meet the 
standard demanded by APP. In this instance, whilst the commands issued by both police and political 
leadeƌs aƌe iŵpliĐitlǇ Đleaƌ, theǇ aƌe Ŷot pƌeĐise aŶd Ŷoǁheƌe is ͞ĐƌitiĐal shot͟ ŵeŶtioŶed. Heƌe, 
officers (and soldiers) have relied upon words that have spurred them on to action and, without 
hesitation or question, have engaged in fire-fights that have resulted in casualties. A literal reading 
of the APP implies that they are entitled to rely on these words but only if specific words are 
pronounced; we suggest that this may not be appropriate in such circumstances.  
With regard to the statement by the Prime Minister, such pronouncements are usually only released 
after careful drafting and legal checking, so this firm statement of instruction still falls far short of 
͚oǁŶeƌship͛. 
The final points we would like to consider are those that follow the action at the school. Here we 
have a joint military and police operation that has led to further innocent fatalities at the hands of 
the intervening force and a terrorist killed by a dog.  These former could be placed in the same 
͚Đollateƌal daŵage͛ category as those shot near the large outdoor ceremony but there is a difference 
here insofar as they have been the victims of deliberate acts. The latter could be said to encapsulate 
our argument, with the dog being used as an instrument of another to carry out an action that 
results in death.          
The subsequent Investigation 
In broad terms, there will be two significant branches to an investigation into an incident of this 
nature. There would be the criminal investigation into the acts of terrorism and the preparation of 
evidence for coronial inquests but there would, under the current system, be an investigation into 
the actions of the armed officers and soldiers. 
Whilst their rules of engagement emphasise the same human rights and use of force principles 
followed by their police colleagues, it is likely that the military would wish to investigate their own 
personnel and, unless a pre-existing agreement was in place, they would follow their own post-
incident procedures. 
It is presumed that if police officers shoot terrorists during a significant armed confrontation, such as 
this hypothetical scenario, then the investigating body will be the IPCC. It is open to question as to 
whether this would be the appropriate body to determine the correctness of actions in what may be 
either a paramilitary or joint police military operation. The complexity of investigating a terrorist 
incident that involved multiple sites and different investigating agencies (police, military, NCA, NBA, 
CAA) is likely to be too much for a body set up to investigate complaints against police officers. The 
iŶeǀitaďle ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of the IPCC͛s iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt ǁould ďe delaǇ due to the sheeƌ ǀoluŵe of 
evidence to be collected, sifted and examined before the investigation into individual actions. It is 
not stretching reality to suggest that such a process is likely to take years, provided everyone 
cooperated. This is a point that former Prime Minister Cameron wished to change, with new 
measures being included in the Criminal Justice Bill, scheduled for introduction in 2016, to speed up 
the inquiry process. This view is shared by some senior members of the judiciary, and in February 
2014 Sir Brian Leveson and Mr Justice Irwin expressed concern that a fear of legal consequences 
  
could endanger lives by officers becoming reluctant to use their firearms. In part of their summing 
up, the learned judges stated, 
͞IŶ our judgment there is considerable force in the expressed concern that minute dissection of 
fractions of a second with the benefit of hindsight will discourage an appropriate response, in real time, 
to threats thereby resulting in potentially increased danger to those involved in (or likely to be affected 
by) these exceedingly difficult operations͟ ;E7 (an officer of the Metropolitan Police) v Sir Christopher 
Holland (Chairman of the Azelle Rodney Inquiry) [2014] EWHC 452 (Admin)). 
All agree that no police officer should have carte blanch to cause death without justification. 
However, we also need to acknowledge that there is a distinct difference between the role of an 
armed police officer and other public servants. Setting aside the military when sent to war or acting 
in a paramilitary policing role, only armed police officers are effectively given licence to kill on behalf 
of the State. However, this view sits at the heart of this debate – the officer being held to account 
rather than being supported (at the highest level) to carry out a very difficult job. It is reasonable to 
assume that armed police officers are acting under instructions from superiors who have examined 
available information and intelligence and have determined that a threat to life exists. Unless there 
is any reason to suppose otherwise, it should be presumed that an officer who inflicts violence upon 
someone he or she suspects of being the person who presents the threat to life will be acting legally 
and in good faith to protect the public. This presumption would not excuse acts that were malicious, 
uncontrolled or unnecessary and an officer would still have to explain his/her actions. The distinct 
difference from the current process is that the burden of proof for mounting an operation that used 
armed police officers as a resource would rest with the highest-ranking commander along with an 
expectation that consideration of consequence was a prominent part of the planning process and 
that puďliĐ safetǇ outǁeighed the ƌisk to the peƌsoŶ͛s life. In this way, the act carried out by the 
officers at the London airport in our hypothetical case would be seen in a different light from a legal 
perspective.   
In terms of subsequent inquiries into the actions of AFOs and their commanders, the IPCC could 
change its approach or be replaced; the current situation of long drawn-out and tortuous enquiries 
has to be reformed. Consideration could be given to the establishment of a part-time corps of 
͚eǆaŵiŶiŶg ŵagistƌates͛ who would be responsible for investigating (exclusively) all police shootings 
but with the knowledge8, training and qualification to conduct thorough, transparent but rapid 
investigations. This would not supersede current legal processes but, working within the guidelines 
of the proposed presumption in law  would be able to deal both with those shootings that were 
within the realm of ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ aƌŵed poliĐiŶg ;moving them rapidly to the coronial process or 
preparing a prosecution case) but also becoming an expert team of investigators for complex 
counter-terrorist operations that may involve multi-agency teams of armed officers or soldiers. 
With an expectation that investigations into police shootings were thorough and timely, time limits 
could be set on how long investigations could continue without resolution, leading to a statute of 
limitations.    
Conclusion 
                                                          
8 For example they would already be aware of the way AFOs train, their different roles and responsibilities, 
military inter-face, command and control structures and equipment; they would not have to learn these things 
at each investigation.   
  
When considering the fictional scenario, which we have used to illustrate the complex challenges 
faced by AFOs), one cannot rely on the legal rule of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) i.e. 
the agents of the state put down a violent threat and caused some collateral damage and we can 
therefore close the chapter and move on. In a democracy, the life of a citizen must be accounted for, 
especially if it has been taken by agents of the State. Without such justification it is far too easy for 
death at the hands of the authorities to become the norm, so we do not argue for a lack of attention 
to detail or thoroughness in the pursuit of truth. 
A number of politicians feel that any police shootings diminish public confidence and they may be 
right. However, we argue that this depends entirely on the circumstances of the particular case. The 
public were immensely supportive of the officers who shot and injured the killers of Fusilier Lee 
Rigby in Woolwich in May 2013 but riots broke out when it was reported (wrongly) that police had 
shot dead an unarmed Mark Duggan in Tottenham in August 2011. Involving the public in the debate 
to change policy (and possibly the law) would allow them the opportunity to understand and have 
confidence in the process by which it was administered. The current review (apparently to be 
reported privately to the Prime Minister) seems to lack the transparency required for such a 
fundamental consideration.   
For armed officers, it is comforting to reflect that none of their colleagues who have been involved 
in shootings have been convicted of a criminal offence, which means that they have every reason to 
believe that they, currently, have both public support and confidence. Nevertheless, this is not 
enough and we argue that they are entitled, as our buffer against the most violent threats to our 
communities, to the support of the law and their elected representatives in Parliament. A balanced 
law that recognises the difficulties involved in a risky and dangerous job and supports those that 
undertake it on our behalf but which expects the highest standards of integrity and competence in 
its delivery must surely be a benefit to everyone. 
We understand that this issue is under consideration but there is no apparent consultation being 
uŶdeƌtakeŶ ǁith the puďliĐ, the poliĐe oƌ the ŵilitaƌǇ; iŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, those likelǇ to ďe iŶ the ͞fƌoŶt 
liŶe͟ aŶd ŵost affeĐted ďǇ aĐtioŶs that are, or are not, taken. The current threat level stands at 
͞“eǀeƌe͟, the second highest level, which means that those who analyse such threats, (the Joint 
Terrorist Analysis Centre) are convinced that an attack is highly likely. So we are running out of time 
to protect our protectors before we are faced with a nightmare scenario, such as we consider above.  
There is a popular saying, which holds that when people are running away from trouble, police 
officers are running towards it. If it is trouble that carries an AK47 and wears an explosive laden 
suicide vest, we owe it to those officers to advance safe in the knowledge that they have the support 
of the public, parliament and the law.          
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